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Asian Financial Crisis and Korean Trade Dynamics 
By 
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Abstract 
 
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Korean international trade has gone up 
substantially in both volume and trade balances.  The improvement is largely due 
to an expansion of international markets through various bilateral trade 
agreements and the structural changes in Korean exchange rates.  This paper 
investigates the exchange rate – trade balance dynamics, popularly known as the  
J-curve phenomenon.  Employing the Bounds-Testing approach to cointegration 
and error-correction modeling on Korean bilateral trade for the pre- and post- 
Asian crisis periods, the study finds that support for the strict version of the J-
curves has been fading after the crisis. The weaker version of J-curve is generally 
supported in both pre- and post-crisis sample periods.  There exists a long-run 
relationship among the Korean exchange rates, domestic income, foreign income, 
and Korean trading balances.  
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I. Introduction 
South Korean international trading has been expanding quite rapidly since the 
Asian financial crisis during 1997-98.  According to the Korea International Trade 
Association, Korean international trade has nearly tripled in total volume since 1998, 
mainly due to her rapid expansion into new markets opened up by WTO and various 
bilateral agreements.  The total number of Korean bilateral agreements is currently 
reaching 329 compared with 50 in 1998.  Korean trade balances have also improved 
dramatically from a $5 billion average deficit during 1988-97 to a $20 billion average 
surplus in 2012 (Figure 1a, 1b and 1c). The turn-around can be largely explained by an 
improvement of global economic environment but also by a significant structural change 
in the Korean real exchange rates since the crisis. 
Until the crash in 1997, the Korean currency, won, was getting stronger against 
the US dollar. Tantamount to a structural change, this trend, reversed after the crisis (Fig. 
2) and the Korean trade balance improved substantially. However, the structural change 
in Korean exchange rates and its impact on her bilateral trade balances has not been clear.  
In this context, this paper investigates the dynamic nature of Korean bilateral trading by 
investigating the J-curve under the changing environment of Korean currency exchange 
rates.   
According to the Marshall-Lerner condition, as long as the import and export 
demand elasticities add up to more than one, real depreciation of a currency improves the 
trade balance of a country. However, there have been circumstances under which this 
condition was met yet the trade balance continued to deteriorate (Bahmani-Oskooee, 
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1985) following a currency devaluation/depreciation.1  The focus, thus, shifted to the 
short-run dynamics that traced the post-depreciation time-path of trade balance to the J-
Curve. Junz and Rhomberg (1973), Magee (1973), and Meade (1988) show that while 
exchange rates adjust instantaneously, it takes some time for consumers and producers to 
adjust to changes in relative prices. Moreover, since currency depreciations make the 
exports cheaper and the imports dearer, trade balance may actually decline for a while 
before showing any signs of improvement. Thus, short-run deteriorations followed by 
long run improvements seem to characterize the post-depreciation time-path of trade 
balance. However, there is no consensus as such and it remains an empirically open issue. 
This paper adds to the literature by investigating the J-Curve effect for South Korea.  
Most of the papers investigating the J-Curve have employed aggregate trade data. 
See, for example, Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2004) for an extensive review of the 
empirical literature investigating the J-Curve effect. A problem with using aggregate data 
is that the regressions potentially suffer from an aggregation bias – a country’s trade 
balance (and/or terms of trade) could be deteriorating with one trading partner while at 
the same time improving with another. In order to overcome this problem, Rose and 
Yellen (1989), Marwah and Klein (1996), Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999), and 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2004) amongst others, have employed US bilateral data.  
Despite the Asian currency crisis and the subsequent trend reversal in Korean 
trade balance, the Korean trade dynamics, it seems, has not received a lot of attention, 
especially when it comes to the J-curve literature. The few Korea-specific empirical 
studies that we came across have sparse evidence of the J-curve, if any. For example, 
                                                 
1 Depreciation means decline in the value of a currency relative to other currencies; devaluation means a 
policy-driven depreciation of a currency. Countries may devalue their currency in response to a declining 
trade balance. The terms “devaluation” and “depreciation” are used interchangeably in this paper.  
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Wilson (2001) examined Korean data over 1970Q1-1996Q4 and found some evidence of 
a J-Curve. Hsing (2005), however, could not come up with any such evidence over 
1980:M1-2001:M12 time-period. Kim (2009) looked at Korea’s bilateral trade with US 
and Japan over 1980Q1-2006Q2. Using the Johansen’s cointegration and error-correction 
modeling on an augmented version of Rose and Yellen (1989) model, he finds some 
evidence of a bilateral J-curve between Korea and Japan.2  This paper adds to this 
literature by examining Korea’s bilateral trade with her 29 trading partners, perhaps the 
largest sample thus far. Together these countries accounted for more than two-third of 
Korea’s trade in the fourth quarter of 2011 (Table 1).  
Our sample includes quarterly data collected from the Korea International Trade 
Association (KITA) and the International Monetary Fund database for the period of 
1988-2011, a time period that also included the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997. During 
the last two quarters of 1997, the Korean won, for example, fell by almost 50%, in real 
terms.  Following such a rapid and steep fall in currency value, one would only expect to 
see a huge improvement in the trade balance. Indeed, Korea’s trade balance moved from 
a deficit of $0.5 billion in 1997 to a staggering surplus of $39 billion in 1998. This was a 
huge improvement also in real terms, which was followed by a steady surplus in trade 
balances in Korea along with a gradual trend of currency depreciation for the next 15 
years. Considering the magnitude of shock from the crisis to the Korean trading patterns 
and its implication for the J-curve phenomenon, this paper also looks into Korean 
bilateral trade dynamics both pre-crisis (currency appreciating regime) as well as post-
                                                 
2 Sun and Chiu (2010) used the same model and methodology as ours but his study was specific to Taiwan. 
They looked at Taiwan’s bilateral trade over 1980:1-2004:12 and reported no evidence of a bilateral J-
curve with Korea. 
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crisis (currency depreciating regime). To this end, we employ a relatively modern time-
series technique known as the Bounds-Testing Approach to Cointegration for the 
empirical analysis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The trade balance model is 
presented in section II, followed by a discussion of the methodology and empirical results 
in Section III. Section IV offers conclusions. Data, definitions, and sources are listed in 
the appendix. 
Table 1 & Figure 1go about here 
 
II. The Trade Balance Model 
We estimate the reduced form trade balance model from Rose and Yellen (1989): 
ln TBjt = a + b ln Yk,t + c ln Yjt + d ln REXjt + εt  …  (1) 
where TBjt is Korean trade balance with trading partner j, Yk,t is the index of Korean real 
GDP, Yjt is the index of country j’s GDP (proxied by industrial production index when 
GDP data are unavailable), and REXjt is the bilateral real exchange rate between the won 
and j’s currency defined such that a decrease reflects a real depreciation of the won 
against trading partner j’s currency. The trade balance is defined as the ratio of Korea’s 
imports from trading partner j over her exports to the same trading partner such that a 
decrease implies a deterioration of trade balance. Note this ratio is unit free, and is the 
nominal as well as real trade balance. Moreover, it lets us use the regressions in log form 
so the coefficient estimates are also elasticities of the corresponding variables. While we 
have no a priori expectations about the signs of b and c, for real depreciation of the won 
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to have a favorable long run impact on the trade balance, we need the estimate of d to be 
positive and significant.3   
III. Methodology and Empirical Results 
Specification (1) outlines the long-run relation (cointegration) among the 
variables of interest. Testing the J-Curve phenomenon requires estimation of the short-
run dynamics (the error-correction model) of the model. We employ the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration, also known as the Bounds-Testing 
Approach to cointegration and error-correction modeling, proposed by Pesaran, et al. 
(2001), and extensively used in recent works in similar context.4 
The error-correction version of the ARDL model pertaining to variables in (1) is 
given by: 
εδδδ
δ
tLnREXjtLnYjtLnYust
LnTBtni LnREXjf i it
n
i LnYjdi it
n
i LnYusci it
n
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141312
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11
   …  (2) 
The procedure then comprises of (1) selection of optimal lag structure for (2), 
based on a criterion such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), followed by an (2) 
an F-test (variable addition test) where the null hypothesis of  “non-existence of 
cointegration” (i.e., H0: δ1=δ2=δ3=δ4) is tested against its alternative. Since the F-test 
results depend on the number of lags imposed on each first differenced variable, we only 
report the value of the F-statistic for lag-structure chosen by AIC in step 1.   
                                                 
3 Normally, imports increase as a country’s income rises. However, if this rise in income is due to increased 
production of import-substitutes, then the country would import less, and experience an improvement in her 
trade balance. 
4 The earlier ones include Engle-Granger cointegration Method (1987), and Johansen-cointegration 
technique (1990). Unlike its predecessors, the ARDL-approach does not require unit-root testing. Bahmani-
Oskoee and Brooks (1999) has a good account of the details on using the ARDL approach in the present 
context.  
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Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c go about here. 
The lower and upper bounds critical values for the F-test are obtained from 
Narayan (2005). If the calculated F-Statistic exceeds the upper bound then the null 
hypothesis if cointegration is rejected, validating the presence of a long-run relation 
among the variables of the trade balance model. If it falls below the lower bound, then the 
null cannot be rejected, and if it falls between the lower and upper bounds, the results are 
inconclusive. Given the 90% critical value of 3.57, there is evidence of cointegration in 
almost all cases (i.e., the variables are all cointegrated). Since our focus is mainly on the 
dynamics of devaluation, we collect the coefficients of the real exchange rate and (2) 
look for evidence of the J-Curve. We also retain the coefficient of the error correction 
terms, as its sign and significance help determine presence of cointegration amongst the 
variables of the trade balance model.5 
Tables 3a, 3b, 3c go about here. 
The J-Curve hypothesis, strictly speaking, calls for a J-shaped post-depreciation 
path of the trade balance. More precisely, following a real depreciation of the won, there 
should be an initial deterioration followed by an improvement in the Korean trade 
balance, both in the short-run.6  While the J-pattern was observed in some cases, patterns 
like M and W were seen as well. See Table 5 for example. The strict version of J-Curve is 
supported in cases of Korea’s trade with Japan for the whole sample; Austria, Belgium, 
France, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore during 
the pre-crisis era; Germany and Hong Kong during the post-crisis era.  As mentioned 
                                                 
5 See for example, Kremers et al. (1992).  
 
6 Note that a negative coefficient of REX implies a deterioration of the trade balance in our model.  
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already, some other short-run patterns were seen as well, so the strict version of the J-
curve may not necessarily hold good (Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha, 2004a and 2004c). 
Accordingly, Bahmani-Oskooee and Brooks (1999) redefined the J-Curve hypothesis as 
short-run deteriorations and long-run improvements of the trade balance.  If we 
subscribe to this weaker version, then there is considerable support for the J-Curve effect.  
Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c go about here. 
Korea has a bilateral J-Curve with Belgium, Brazil, China, Germany, Greece, 
India, Italy, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland during the whole sample period; 
with Australia, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the UK during the pre-crisis era; Belgium, Brazil, 
China, Denmark, India, Indonesia, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain, and the US during the post-crisis era7.  
Table 5 goes about here  
Interestingly, the long-run coefficient of the real bilateral exchange rate carries the 
expected sign (i.e., positive) in most cases, regardless of the time period - depreciation of 
the Korean won has a favorable impact on Korean trade balance in the long run. Actually 
most of the positive coefficients are recorded for the sample spanning over the entire time 
period, followed by the post-crisis era.8 This indicates currency devaluation works better 
in the long-run, and the effect varies positively with the extent of depreciation. We note 
                                                 
7 For these trading partners, REX carries at least one positive coefficient in the short-run and a positive 
coefficient in the long-run, whether significant or not.    
 
8 For Japan, the coefficient of REX is negative throughout and becomes insignificant post-crisis, implying 
currency devaluation is unlikely to improve Korea’s trade deficit with Japan. This may have been because 
of Korea’s heavy dependence on imported inputs from Japan. Currency depreciation boosts Korean total 
exports and thus Korean demand for Japanese components, hence REX takes on the paradoxical negative 
sign. For China, likewise, the REX is insignificant (although its signs change), again indicating relative 
ineffectiveness of currency devaluation in impacting the Korea-China trade balance.         
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that REX carries a positive and significant long-run coefficient in cases of Belgium, 
Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK for the whole sample; 
Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, and Italy during the pre-crisis era; New Zealand, Norway, 
and Philippines during the post-crisis era. However, the coefficient is negative and 
significant in cases of Malaysia (whole-sample); Philippines, Portugal, and Spain (pre-
crisis); and Greece (post-crisis), thus depreciation of the won relative to the currencies of 
these countries is likely to hurt Korean trade balance. 
The long-run results also indicate that economic growth in Korea is often 
associated with deteriorations in her bilateral trade balance, especially with Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Sweden, and Thailand during 
1988-2011 (whole sample); with Belgium, China, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, 
and the UK during the pre-crisis era; with Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Malaysia, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the 
US during the post-crisis era.  These income effects are reversed when it comes to Japan 
and New Zealand for the whole sample; Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Portugal, and the 
US pre-crisis; and New Zealand and Norway post-crisis. Interestingly, economic growth 
in trading partners appears to help Korean bilateral trade balances in most cases, with the 
exception of Japan – a major supplier to Korea’s exports sector. As the saying goes, 
Korea replaces Japan’s exports!     
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Using the bounds-testing approach to cointegration and error-correction 
modeling, we find there is a long run relation among the won’s exchange rates, incomes 
(both domestic and foreign) and trade balance. A real depreciation of the won helps 
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improve the Korean trade balance in the long run (Table 5). However, the effects vary 
from country to country, and interestingly enough, real exchange rate either took the 
wrong sign or was insignificant for Japan and China, Korea’s major trading partners. In 
fact, post-crisis, it had the expected positive sign and significance only in three cases 
(New Zealand, Norway, and Philippines) compared to four (Belgium, Germany, 
Indonesia, and Italy), prior to the crisis. Thus, the Asian currency crisis likely has altered 
the long-run trade-dynamics of Korea. However, how long is the long-run? When we 
estimate our trade balance model for the whole sample, the real exchange rate takes on 
the expected positive sign in most cases and becomes significant for seven countries, viz. 
Belgium, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK. Thus, 
effectiveness of expenditure-switching policies (such as currency devaluation) depends 
on the planning horizon as well as the specific trading partner concerned, the latter 
finding a direct upshot of using bilateral (instead of aggregate) trade data, above and 
beyond reducing some aggregation bias.  
As far as the short-run dynamics go, we could not decipher any specific pattern, 
let alone the strict, text-book version of the J-Curve. In fact, the sign patterns indicated 
the presence of several other patterns as well, including a W-, M-, and N-curves (Table 
5). While short-run dynamics do not support the textbook version of the J-Curve, 
redefining the J-Curve hypothesis as short-run deterioration and long-run improvement of 
the trade balance yields better support.  This is consistent with previous work.  
Other than real exchange rate, domestic and foreign incomes, we recognize that 
trade restrictions such as tariffs and quotas, exchange rate regimes, currency crises, and 
various other institutional and infrastructural factors can all impact a country’s trade 
 11 
balance. While it is difficult to account for all these factors, consistent with economic 
theory, real exchange rate -  the key policy variable – takes on the expected positive sign 
in most cases after the Asian crisis: Currency depreciation has a favorable impact on 
trade balance.  
Appendix 
Data, Definition and Sources 
 
Sources 
Quarterly  data are used to carry out the empirical work. The sample comprises of 
Korea’s trade with her 29 trading partners, viz. Australia (1988Q1-2011Q2), Austria 
(1988Q1-2011Q3), Belgium (1988Q1-2011Q3), Brazil (1991Q1-2011Q4), China 
((1991Q1-2011Q4), Denmark (1988Q1-2011Q3), France (1988Q1-2011Q3), Germany 
(1988Q1-2011Q3), Greece (1995Q1-2011Q4), Hong Kong (1988Q1-2011Q3), India 
(1988Q1-2011Q1), Indonesia (1988Q1-2011Q4), Ireland (1988Q1-2011Q3), Italy 
(1988Q1-2011Q3), Japan (1988Q1-2011Q3), Malaysia (1988Q1-2011Q3), Mexico 
(1988Q1-2011Q3), Netherlands (1988Q1-2011Q3), New Zealand (1988Q2-2011Q3), 
Norway (1990Q4-2011Q3), Philippines (1988Q1-2011Q3), Portugal (1988Q1-2011Q3), 
Singapore (1988Q1-2011Q3), Spain (1988Q1-2011Q3), Sweden (1988Q1-2011Q3), 
Switzerland (1988Q1-2011Q3), Thailand (1993Q1-2011Q4), United Kingdom (1988Q1-
2011Q3), and the United States (1988Q1-2011Q3).  
a. Korea International Trade Association (KITA). The exports and imports data are 
collected from this source. 
b. International Financial Statistics of IMF. This is used for other data. 
 
Variables 
TBj = US trade balance with her trading partner j is defined as the ratio of Korea’s 
imports from country j over her exports to j (collected from source a). Thus, a decrease in 
this ratio implies an improvement of the trade balance. 
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Yj = Index of real GDP of country j. Industrial production index (collected from 
source b) is used as a proxy when GDP data are not available.  
 
Yk = Index of real GDP of the Korea.  Again Korea’s industrial production index 
is used whenever the trading partner’s GDP data were not available.  
 
REXj = Bilateral real exchange rate between Korean won and trading partner j’s 
currency. It is defined as Pk/(NEXj*/Pj), where Pk is the Korean CPI, P j is country j’s 
CPI, and NEXj is the nominal bilateral exchange rate defined as the number of  won per 
unit of j’s currency. Thus a decline in REXj is a reflection of real depreciation of Korean 
won relative to j’s currency. 
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Figure 1a 
 
 
 
Figure 1b 
 
 
 
Figure 1c 
 
Data Source: Korea International Trade Association, http://www.kita.net/ 
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Figure 2a 
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Table 1: Korea’s Bilateral Trade with Select Countries in 2011Q4  
(Millions of US dollars) 
 
Trading 
Partner Export Import Trade Balance Total Trade Share (%) 
Australia 8164 26316 -18152 34480 3.2 
Austria 838 1330 -492 2168 0.2 
Belgium 2255 1450 805 3705 0.3 
Brazil 11821 6343 5478 18164 1.7 
Pr.China 134185 86432 47753 220617 20.4 
Denmark 438 715 -277 1153 0.1 
France 5707 6315 -608 12022 1.1 
Germany 9501 16963 -7462 26464 2.5 
Greece 1350 91 1259 1441 0.1 
Hong Kong 30968 2315 28653 33283 3.1 
India 12654 7894 4761 20548 1.9 
Indonesia 13564 17216 -3652 30780 2.9 
Ireland 356 719 -363 1075 0.1 
Italy 4107 4374 -266 8481 0.8 
Japan 39680 68320 -28640 108000 10.0 
Malaysia 6275 10468 -4193 16743 1.6 
Mexico 9729 2316 7413 12045 1.1 
New Zealand 1104 1474 -370 2578 0.2 
Netherland 4627 4426 201 9053 0.8 
Norway 666 2595 -1928 3261 0.3 
Philippines 7339 3571 3767 10910 1.0 
Portugal 713 100 613 813 0.1 
Singapore 20839 8967 11872 29806 2.8 
Spain 1857 1162 695 3019 0.3 
Sweden 1043 2144 -1101 3187 0.3 
Switzerland 1130 2555 -1425 3685 0.3 
Thailand 8459 5413 3046 13872 1.3 
U. Kingdom 4969 3818 1151 8787 0.8 
U.S.A 56208 44569 11639 100777 9.3 
TOTAL 555214 524413 30801 1079627 68.6 
 
Note: The sample accounts for 68.6% of Korea’s total trade in 2011Q4. 
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Table 2: The F-Test for Cointegration 
 
Trading Partner 
 
Calculated F-statistic for Different Lag Length Imposed on the 
First-Differenced Variables 
Whole Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Australia 18.31*** 2.12 6.12** 
Austria 1.79 2.91 4.79** 
Belgium 6.95*** 4.05* 9.21*** 
Brazil 1.04 4.55* 5.42** 
China 4.27* 1.78 5.35** 
Denmark 11.45*** 2.37 9.12*** 
France 4.05* 7.94*** 3.10 
Germany 7.84*** 6.44** 9.58*** 
Greece 5.21** - 8.52*** 
Hong Kong 5.85** 2.72 19.08*** 
India 5.98*** 3.66 3.88 
Indonesia 7.84*** 7.60*** 2.10 
Ireland 6.81*** 4.67* 7.73*** 
Italy 11.00*** 6.40*** 7.68*** 
Japan 4.82** 7.50*** 1.53 
Malaysia 3.74 6.82*** 13.71*** 
Mexico 10.45*** 5.35** 3.50 
New Zealand 11.32*** 2.43 6.45*** 
Netherland 11.72*** 7.09*** 8.11*** 
Norway 0.80 2.95 8.61*** 
Philippines 5.54** 9.92*** 2.98 
Portugal 4.31* 6.30*** 12.90*** 
Singapore 6.89*** 2.69 8.93*** 
Spain 6.59*** 7.40*** 9.75*** 
Sweden 5.00** 2.86 3.05 
Switzerland 8.50*** 4.36* 7.42*** 
Thailand 5.35** - 6.31*** 
U. Kingdom 10.11*** 5.82** 6.85*** 
U.S.A 8.93*** 6.84*** 3.66 
 
Note: Asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3a: Coefficient Estimates of Exchange Rate and Error Correction Term Based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
 
Trading 
Partner 
 
DLREX 
 
DLREX1 
 
DLREX2 
 
DLREX3 
 
DLREX4 
 
DLREX5 
 
DLREX6 
 
DLREX7 
 
DLREX8 
 
DLREX9 
 
DLREX10 
 
DLREX11 
 
EC(-1) 
Australia -0.12 (0.22)            -1.00* 
Austria 0.31 (0.87)            
-0.20* 
(2.02) 
Belgium -0.51 (0.97)            
-0.47* 
(5.14) 
Brazil -0.98 (0.85) 
-0.89 
(0.80) 
-4.59* 
(2.59) 
-1.31 
(0.88) 
-2.32 
(1.12) 
0.51 
(0.28) 
-2.29 
(1.08) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
-1.60 
(0.92) 
0.45 
(0.28) 
0.51 
(0.39) 
1.93 
(1.50) 
-0.09 
(0.34) 
China 1.31* (2.75) 
0.36 
(0.70) 
-0.84 
(1.56) 
-0.73 
(1.23) 
-0.79 
(1.31) 
-0.39 
(0.50) 
-1.49* 
(2.09) 
-0.12 
(0.19) 
-0.84 
(1.36) 
0.14 
(0.25) 
-0.97 
(1.67)  
-0.12 
(0.39) 
Denmark 0.80 (1.62)            
-0.65* 
(6.20) 
France -0.27 (0.89)            
-1.74* 
(4.33) 
Germany -0.75 (1.92) 
-0.99* 
(2.65)           
-0.74* 
(5.43) 
Greece 1.47 (0.29) 
-4.32 
(0.76) 
-1.34 
(0.23) 
-3.53 
(0.50) 
2.06 
(0.24) 
-6.53 
(0.87) 
-7.53 
(1.19) 
-7.53 
(1.22) 
-13.93* 
(2.30) 
-6.96 
(1.23) 
-10.86* 
(2.45)  
-6.73* 
(3.87) 
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Hong Kong 0.55 (1.50)            
-0.48* 
(4.59) 
India -0.77 (0.96) 
0.45 
(0.51) 
1.21 
(1.36) 
3.58* 
(3.88) 
0.59 
(0.70) 
0.20 
(0.21) 
-0.16 
(0.17) 
2.91* 
(3.13) 
0.86 
(1.02) 
2.43* 
(2.99) 
-1.38 
(1.61)  
-0.37* 
(2.06) 
Indonesia 0.68 (1.93)            
-0.54* 
(5.33) 
Ireland 0.11 (0.37)            
-0.82* 
(5.43) 
Italy -0.16 (0.22) 
-1.20 
(1.50)           
-0.64* 
(6.23) 
Japan -0.27 (0.22) 
4.68* 
(3.37) 
1.04 
(0.76) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
2.28 
(1.74) 
4.77* 
(3.54) 
2.59 
(1.88) 
4.37* 
(3.19) 
3.55* 
(2.45) 
1.56 
(1.23) 
2.01 
(1.54)  
0.81* 
(3.56) 
Malaysia -2.44 (1.69) 
2.13 
(1.54) 
1.85 
(1.29) 
-0.26 
(0.18) 
-1.70 
(1.25) 
2.52 
(1.88) 
1.35 
(0.90) 
1.42 
(0.98) 
2.15 
(1.51)    
-1.21* 
(3.36) 
Mexico 0.92* (2.87)            
-0.64* 
(6.53) 
Netherlands 0.28 (0.64)            
-0.84* 
(6.61) 
New 
Zealand 
0.87* 
(2.21)            
-0.78* 
(7.05) 
Norway 2.45 (1.27) 
-4.39 
(1.81) 
-2.29 
(1.15) 
2.80 
(1.44) 
-2.18 
(1.08) 
-2.03 
(1.17) 
2.27 
(1.21) 
0.51 
(0.26) 
2.48 
(1.36) 
2.64 
(1.35) 
-0.58 
(0.30) 
-3.50 
(1.77) 
-0.65 
(1.59) 
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Philippines 0.43 (1.70)            
-0.46* 
(4.81) 
Portugal 0.50 (0.33) 
-2.34 
(1.44) 
-3.51* 
(2.28) 
-2.22 
(1.48) 
-0.59 
(0.40) 
-2.05 
(1.55) 
2.21 
(1.52)      
-0.04 
(0.21) 
Singapore 3.29 (3.37) 
0.74 
(0.93) 
-0.37 
(0.43) 
-2.21* 
(2.34) 
-0.98 
(1.00) 
-1.89* 
(1.96) 
-0.78 
(0.71) 
-2.19* 
(2.07) 
-2.17* 
(2.21) 
-0.86 
(1.03) 
-1.40 
(1.70) 
1.39 
(1.62) 
-1.16* 
(3.82) 
Spain 0.72 (0.89) 
0.38 
(0.39) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.53 
(0.62) 
-0.90 
(1.10) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.28 
(0.32) 
-0.20 
(0.23) 
-0.71 
(0.93) 
0.31 
(0.43) 
1.75* 
(2.45) 
1.37 
(1.89) 
-0.37* 
(2.24) 
Sweden 0.46 (0.41) 
-1.54 
(1.28) 
-0.70 
(0.59) 
-3.55* 
(2.95) 
-2.66* 
(2.24) 
2.31* 
(2.01)       
-0.71* 
(4.45) 
Switzerland 0.62 (0.65) 
-0.49 
(0.47) 
-2.96* 
(2.81) 
-1.45 
(1.38) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
3.57* 
(4.06)       
-0.52* 
(5.28) 
Thailand -6.54 (1.15) 
16.84* 
(3.70) 
10.51* 
(2.34) 
16.83* 
(2.82) 
-1.68 
(0.30) 
13.88* 
(2.87) 
16.11* 
(2.68) 
10.91* 
(2.01) 
3.69 
(0.77) 
-8.62 
(1.85) 
-0.50 
(0.14) 
-6.55 
(1.52) 
-2.51* 
(2.71) 
United 
Kingdom 
0.63* 
(2.70)            
-0.56* 
(5.99) 
United 
States 
-0.07 
(0.17)            
-0.60* 
(5.67) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic; * denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 3b: Coefficient Estimates of Exchange Rate and Error Correction Term Based on AIC (Pre-Crisis) 
 
Trading Partner 
 
DLREX 
 
DLREX1 
 
DLREX2 
 
DLREX3 
 
DLREX4 
 
DLREX5 
 
DLREX6 
 
DLREX7 
 
DLREX8 
 
DLREX9 
 
DLREX10 
 
DLREX11 
 
EC(-1) 
Australia 0.38 (0.06) 
-42.36* 
(2.19) 
-0.52 
(0.05) 
-23.99 
(1.87) 
-14.06 
(1.60) 
-17.61* 
(2.11)       
-0.24 
(0.33) 
Austria -2.03 (0.55) 
-0.29 
(0.08) 
-1.02 
(0.42) 
1.26 
(0.70) 
2.40 
(1.40)        
-2.38* 
(2.96) 
Belgium 1.52 (1.23) 
-5.17* 
(2.15) 
-5.59* 
(2.89) 
-4.15 
(1.88) 
-1.00 
(0.68) 
-1.80 
(1.55)       
-4.22* 
(2.94) 
Brazil 0.29 (0.14) 
6.76* 
(2.91)           
-0.43* 
(2.00) 
China 6.35 (0.99) 
2.43 
(0.55) 
6.88 
(1.06) 
9.41 
(1.10)         
-2.32 
(1.94) 
Denmark -2.76 (1.43) 
5.23 
(1.82) 
-5.51 
(2.40) 
11.24* 
(3.96) 
-2.51 
(1.05) 
2.33 
(0.96)       
-2.05* 
(3.48) 
France -0.43 (0.33) 
1.71 
(1.09) 
1.32 
(1.07) 
1.79 
(1.56) 
0.44 
(0.37) 
3.18 
(2.90)       
-1.00* 
(large) 
Germany -0.50 (0.44) 
-3.65* 
(2.66) 
-2.61* 
(2.46) 
-2.63* 
(2.39) 
-0.64 
(0.77) 
-1.20 
(1.64)       
-1.93* 
(4.35) 
Greece -2.26 (1.07) 
-3.37 
(1.74)           
-1.92* 
(5.84) 
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Hong Kong 
 
-0.63 
(0.07) 
 
-1.63 
(0.06) 
-0.49 
(0.06) 
-2.37 
(0.06) 
3.08 
(0.06) 
8.87 
(0.06)       
-3.48* 
(2.40) 
India 1.48 (0.70) 
-3.21 
(1.33)           
-0.15 
(0.24) 
Indonesia 10.30* (2.36) 
-0.39 
(0.06) 
-8.17 
(1.31) 
2.57 
(0.37) 
5.13 
(0.79)        
-4.07* 
(5.49) 
Ireland 1.81 (1.12) 
-4.16 
(1.31) 
-5.97* 
(2.58) 
0.87 
(0.44) 
-3.00 
(1.78)        
0.29 
(0.37) 
Italy 0.38 (0.45) 
-1.91* 
(2.52) 
-1.03 
(1.23) 
-0.22 
(0.31) 
-1.27 
(1.74)        
-1.80* 
(3.97) 
Japan -8.61* (3.11) 
14.89* 
(4.46) 
8.96* 
(2.62)          
-1.00* 
(large) 
Malaysia 1.47 (1.33) 
-2.96* 
(2.16)           
-1.99* 
(5.42) 
Mexico -2.12 (1.52) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
1.12 
(0.89) 
1.96 
(1.77)         
-1.61* 
(4.01) 
Netherlands -1.08 (0.69) 
10.90 
(4.43) 
5.18* 
(2.41) 
3.28 
(1.92) 
13.76 
(4.43)        
-0.29 
(0.60) 
New Zealand 0.47 (0.05) 
-3.27 
(0.32) 
9.48 
(0.91) 
-7.31 
(0.98) 
-11.77 
(1.36)        
-3.72* 
(2.11) 
Norway -0.35 (0.07) 
0.40 
(0.06) 
-1.37 
(0.29) 
7.25 
(1.54)         
-1.19* 
(2.07) 
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Philippines -1.88 (1.72) 
4.30* 
(3.13) 
2.63* 
(2.32) 
1.53 
(1.47)         
-1.53* 
(5.64) 
Portugal -11.50 (1.83) 
18.84* 
(2.72) 
16.17* 
(2.06) 
5.70 
(1.40) 
17.87* 
(3.16)        
-1.77* 
(4.83) 
Singapore -3.68* (2.04) 
-0.17 
(0.10) 
-1.26 
(0.63) 
-4.06* 
(2.37) 
2.53 
(1.52)        
-2.61* 
(2.66) 
Spain 0.99 (1.07) 
1.00 
(1.02) 
4.07* 
(3.67)          
-2.23* 
(5.30) 
Sweden 13.42* (3.56) 
3.04 
(0.86) 
16.22* 
(4.66) 
-0.81 
(0.26) 
1.45 
(0.47) 
19.33* 
(4.03)       
-0.49 
(0.87) 
Switzerland -2.91 (1.41) 
-5.52 
(1.88) 
-1.41 
(0.56) 
0.01 
(0.005) 
-4.46 
(1.82)        
-0.84 
(1.00) 
Thailand 0.38 (0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
United Kingdom 0.49 (0.80) 
-0.46 
(0.44) 
0.21 
(0.25) 
-1.73* 
(2.37) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.84 
(1.32)       
-1.95* 
(4.11) 
United States 3.74 (1.81)            
-1.00* 
(large) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic; * denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 3c: Coefficient Estimates of Exchange Rate and Error Correction Term Based on AIC  (Post-Crisis) 
 
Trading Partner 
 
DLREX 
 
DLREX1 
 
DLREX2 
 
DLREX3 
 
DLREX4 
 
DLREX5 
 
DLREX6 
 
DLREX7 
 
DLREX8 
 
DLREX9 
 
DLREX10 
 
DLREX11 
 
EC(-1) 
Australia 0.05 (0.29)            
-0.61* 
(4.75) 
Austria 0.75 (1.39) 
-0.10 
(0.18) 
0.37 
(0.68) 
1.36* 
(2.63) 
1.14* 
(2.16) 
1.40* 
(2.33)       
-0.18 
(1.35) 
Belgium -2.80* (3.12)            
-0.84* 
(5.25) 
Brazil -0.95 (1.28) 
1.83* 
(2.37) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.65 
(0.77) 
1.85* 
(2.09) 
2.05* 
(2.42)       
0.04 
(0.18) 
China 0.78 (1.56) 
0.28 
(0.60) 
-0.92* 
(2.43) 
-0.56 
(1.15) 
0.27 
(0.60) 
0.54 
(1.12)       
-0.03 
(0.08) 
Denmark 1.04 (1.08) 
-1.90 
(1.75) 
-0.52 
(0.54) 
-1.74 
(1.59) 
-0.36 
(0.37) 
0.59 
(0.60) 
-1.70 
(1.95) 
2.82* 
(2.95)     
-1.12* 
(5.83) 
France -0.41 (0.84)            
-0.92* 
(2.89) 
Germany -2.48* (4.98) 
-2.13* 
(4.72) 
-0.41 
(0.78) 
-0.44 
(0.98) 
-0.28 
(0.73) 
-0.79* 
(2.10) 
0.57 
(1.51) 
0.53 
(1.35)     
-2.05* 
(5.93) 
Greece -2.26 (1.07) 
-3.37 
(1.74)           
-1.92* 
(5.84) 
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Hong Kong -0.77 (1.30) 
0.55 
(0.76) 
1.06 
(1.59) 
1.09 
(1.50) 
0.97 
(1.46) 
1.49* 
(2.45)       
-1.64* 
(8.54) 
India 0.003 (0.002) 
-2.53* 
(2.10) 
-1.34 
(1.20) 
0.44 
(0.38) 
-1.84 
(1.58) 
-1.93 
(1.63)       
-0.63* 
(3.13) 
Indonesia 0.41 (0.51) 
-0.56 
(0.71) 
-1.02 
(1.36) 
-2.23* 
(3.40)         
-0.29 
(1.49) 
Ireland 0.28 (0.79)            
0.38 
(0.06) 
Italy -1.39 (1.20)            
-1.00* 
(4.03) 
Japan 0.12 (0.10) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
0.22 
(0.16) 
-1.35 
(0.83) 
1.44 
(0.85) 
3.02 
(1.94) 
1.47 
(1.06) 
1.47 
(1.17)     
-0.55 
(0.69) 
Malaysia 3.38* (2.35)            
1.90* 
(7.77) 
Mexico 0.29 (0.57)            
-0.39* 
(3.30) 
Netherlands 0.10 (0.18)            
0.80* 
(5.56) 
New Zealand -0.22 (0.39) 
-0.91 
(1.37) 
-1.46* 
(2.46) 
-1.42* 
(2.32)         
-1.27* 
(4.95) 
Norway 5.28* (0.06) 
-0.21 
(0.12) 
-3.77* 
(2.12) 
-1.74 
(0.98) 
-6.76* 
(3.75) 
-1.75 
(1.04) 
-1.74 
(0.84) 
-8.49* 
(4.02)     
-1.95* 
(5.08) 
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Philippines 0.53* (2.18)            
-0.79* 
(3.28) 
Portugal -1.67 (1.08) 
-1.76 
(1.32) 
-6.28* 
(4.41) 
-3.36* 
(2.60) 
-2.10 
(1.78)        
-1.32* 
(7.03) 
Singapore 2.59* (3.28) 
1.52 
(1.83) 
1.36 
(1.61) 
0.62 
(0.74) 
1.97* 
(2.58) 
-0.88 
(1.24)       
-2.24* 
(5.97) 
Spain -0.97 (1.24)            
-1.28* 
(5.70) 
Sweden 2.07* (2.17)            
0.14* 
(2.17) 
Switzerland -2.04 (1.94) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
-3.77* 
(3.35) 
-2.26 
(1.66) 
-3.14* 
(2.14) 
2.43 
(1.60) 
-0.49 
(0.36) 
3.64* 
(3.04)     
-1.74* 
(5.09) 
Thailand 7.06 (1.49) 
7.57 
(1.87) 
12.53* 
(3.11) 
3.24 
(0.79) 
3.57 
(0.94) 
6.11 
(1.77) 
10.13* 
(2.74) 
5.84 
(1.90)     
-2.19* 
(4.75) 
United Kingdom -0.64 (0.96)            
-1.02* 
(5.23) 
United States 2.57 (1.59) 
-0.89 
(0.74) 
1.54 
(1.33) 
-1.23 
(1.11) 
0.58 
(0.55) 
-2.62* 
(2.41) 
2.90* 
(2.75)      
-1.05* 
(3.80) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic; * denotes significance at 5% level. 
 
 
Table 4a: Estimated Long Run Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Balance Model 
Based on Akaike Information Criterion 
 
Trading Partner 
( country j) YK Yj REXj Intercept 
Australia 3.28 (1.71) 
-4.32 
(1.56) 
-0.12 
(0.22) 
5.34 
(1.46) 
Austria 2.41 (0.69) 
-5.19 
(0.65) 
1.60 
(0.80) 
24.43 
(1.15) 
Belgium 0.11 (0.11) 
0.47 
(0.31) 
1.64* 
(2.51) 
8.32* 
(3.34) 
Brazil 33.75 (0.31) 
-81.13 
(0.31) 
6.14 
(0.33) 
258.63 
(0.33) 
China -0.38 (0.05) 
1.24 
(0.22) 
7.32 
(0.34) 
33.46 
(0.33) 
Denmark 2.43* (2.05) 
-5.21 
(1.79) 
1.23 
(1.64) 
21.88* 
(2.09) 
France 1.44* (5.25) 
-4.25* 
(5.83) 
-0.15 
(0.89) 
11.93* 
(5.27) 
Germany 2.24* (3.45) 
-6.89* 
(3.44) 
0.34 
(1.03) 
24.04* 
(3.42) 
Greece 2.50* (3.63) 
-10.36* 
(6.52) 
0.29 
(0.19) 
34.96* 
(2.43) 
Hong Kong 2.84 (1.65) 
-4.11 
(1.70) 
1.14 
(1.51) 
9.62 
(1.36) 
India -9.12 (1.82) 
10.59 
(1.77) 
-2.09 
(1.47) 
-15.25 
(1.77) 
Indonesia 0.002 (0.004) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
1.25* 
(2.13) 
1.54 
(0.47) 
Ireland 1.06* (2.02) 
-0.63* 
(2.22) 
0.13 
(0.36) 
-0.77 
(0.32) 
Italy 2.49* (2.51) 
-10.47* 
(3.27) 
1.76* 
(2.20) 
49.05* 
(4.76) 
Japan -4.06* (2.10) 
26.18* 
(2.47) 
-4.25* 
(2.80) 
-111.33* 
(2.59) 
Malaysia 11.62* (6.78) 
-11.17* 
(7.00) 
-1.43* 
(2.00) 
-10.25* 
(2.12) 
Mexico -2.65 (1.65) 
5.16 
(1.74) 
1.45* 
(3.05) 
-6.23 
(1.21) 
Netherlands 2.89* (2.88) 
-6.32* 
(3.12) 
0.34 
(0.65) 
17.64* 
(3.52) 
New Zealand -2.32* (2.20) 
2.24 
(1.30) 
1.12* 
(2.22) 
8.35* 
(2.69) 
Norway -0.11 (0.02) 
0.51 
(0.07) 
-1.09 
(0.38) 
-9.54 
(0.36) 
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Philippines -0.16 (0.12) 
1.65 
(1.15) 
0.94 
(1.72) 
-4.46* 
(2.28) 
Portugal -43.13 (0.19) 
257.74 
(0.21) 
86.19 
(0.21) 
-355.99 
(0.20) 
Singapore -1.01 (0.56) 
1.62 
(1.09) 
2.65* 
(4.90) 
14.88 
(3.17) 
Spain -0.03 (0.01) 
3.60 
(0.61) 
1.07 
(0.36) 
-10.28 
(0.60) 
Sweden 4.39* (2.37) 
-6.76* 
(2.08) 
-0.34 
(0.27) 
9.34 
(1.55) 
Switzerland -0.15 (0.12) 
6.47 
(1.72) 
2.28 
(1.84) 
12.46 
(0.99) 
Thailand 6.24* (2.28) 
-9.16* 
(2.48) 
-2.39 
(1.76) 
4.40 
(1.09) 
United 
Kingdom 
1.03 
(1.17) 
-1.73 
(1.02) 
1.12* 
(2.72) 
11.39* 
(4.02) 
United States 1.86 (1.18) 
-4.30 
(1.52) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
9.95 
(1.83) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic; * denotes 
significance at 5% level. 
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Table 4b: Estimated Long Run Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Balance Model 
Based on Akaike Information Criterion, Pre-Crisis 
 
Trading Partner 
( country j) YK Yj REXj Intercept 
Australia 59.20 (0.42) 
-6.86 
(0.11) 
76.04 
(0.42) 
-703.31 
(0.40) 
Austria 4.55 (1.41) 
-3.96 
(0.47) 
0.26 
(0.11) 
1.20 
(0.12) 
Belgium 5.03* (6.71) 
-10.31* 
(4.07) 
1.94* 
(5.96) 
35.50* 
(4.23) 
Brazil -13.67 (1.64) 
17.34 
(0.88) 
-3.75 
(1.17) 
-45.58 
(0.81) 
China 11.15* (6.81) 
-7.77* 
(9.26) 
-0.93 
(0.77) 
-21.81* 
(4.99) 
Denmark 0.39 (0.41) 
7.22 
(1.81) 
-1.61 
(1.03) 
-44.37 
(1.82) 
France 0.69 (0.20) 
1.88 
(0.11) 
-0.93 
(0.40) 
-17.42 
(0.35) 
Germany -0.71 (1.01) 
1.79 
(1.36) 
2.20* 
(1.98) 
11.44* 
(2.13) 
Greece - - - - 
Hong Kong -5.80 (1.24) 
6.70 
(0.80) 
0.85 
(0.23) 
-2.98 
(0.54) 
India -162.80 (0.23) 
184.62 
(0.23) 
36.20 
(0.23) 
-0.07 
(0.02) 
Indonesia 3.34* (4.27) 
-2.51* 
(3.32) 
6.36* 
(2.97) 
-13.98* 
(2.81) 
Ireland -5.52 (0.54) 
7.67 
(0.42) 
-38.99 
(0.40) 
-283.95 
(0.40) 
Italy 2.24* (7.16) 
-2.35 
(1.73) 
1.40* 
(2.43) 
11.53 
(1.49) 
Japan -8.76* (2.31) 
57.68* 
(3.44) 
-13.41* 
(4.14) 
255.58* 
(3.85) 
Malaysia -0.92* (2.97) 
-1.32* 
(5.20) 
0.08 
(0.24) 
9.61* 
(4.65) 
Mexico 0.99 (0.49) 
-2.44 
(0.43) 
0.63 
(0.67) 
6.74 
(0.52) 
Netherlands -18.23 (0.46) 
121.14 
(0.52) 
-39.02 
(0.54) 
-721.91 
(0.53) 
New Zealand 0.53 (0.26) 
0.57 
(0.12) 
2.52 
(1.16) 
13.01* 
(2.70) 
Norway 7.84 (0.35) 
-18.58 
(0.50) 
6.28 
(1.07) 
92.09 
(1.19) 
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Philippines -2.69* (4.76) 
4.15* 
(4.30) 
-2.74* 
(2.23) 
-16.45* 
(3.39) 
Portugal -11.15* (4.05) 
0.40 
(0.03) 
-18.49* 
(2.74) 
-83.52* 
(2.47) 
Singapore 0.97 (0.69) 
-1.42 
(1.24) 
-0.82 
(1.26) 
-4.55 
(1.23) 
Spain 4.27* (11.87) 
-10.78* 
(8.00) 
-1.37* 
(3.38) 
17.96* 
(4.15) 
Sweden 3.10 (0.78) 
45.60 
(0.75) 
-10.23 
(0.76) 
-263.55 
(0.82) 
Switzerland 4.62* (2.77) 
-61.81 
(1.25) 
0.96 
(0.18) 
261.67 
(1.13) 
Thailand - - - - 
United 
Kingdom 
1.88* 
(7.72) 
-4.08* 
(3.66) 
0.11 
(0.21) 
10.27 
(1.31) 
United States -2.35* (2.02) 
5.44 
(1.79) 
3.74 
(1.81) 
12.14 
(0.59) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic; * denotes 
significance at 5% level. 
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Table 4c: Estimated Long Run Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Balance Model 
Based on Akaike Information Criterion, Post-Crisis 
 
Trading Partner 
( country j) YK Yj REXj Intercept 
Australia 0.10 (0.10) 
1.14 
(0.67) 
0.08 
(0.29) 
-4.15 
(1.73) 
Austria -2.84 (0.46) 
15.19 
(0.91) 
-0.71 
(0.28) 
-61.93 
(1.23) 
Belgium -4.27* (3.29) 
4.87* 
(2.57) 
0.16 
(0.30) 
2.36 
(0.42) 
Brazil -222.10 (0.18) 
520.59 
(0.18) 
43.31 
(0.18) 
-1124.10 
(0.18) 
China -5.53 (0.08) 
9.99 
(0.08) 
18.33 
(0.08) 
94.73 
(0.08) 
Denmark 1.96* (2.46) 
-3.73 
(1.73) 
0.66 
(0.74) 
13.04 
(1.17) 
France 1.03 (0.80) 
-3.90 
(1.14) 
-0.44 
(0.78) 
10.03 
(0.78) 
Germany 0.89* (4.28) 
-2.01* 
(2.64) 
-0.55* 
(2.84) 
1.27 
(0.39) 
Greece 1.03* (2.81) 
-7.14* 
(6.60) 
-1.48* 
(2.46) 
13.97* 
(2.01) 
Hong Kong 5.39* (10.01) 
-4.16* 
(6.59) 
-0.87* 
(3.46) 
-12.21* 
(4.66) 
India 1.91 (0.97) 
-1.05 
(0.44) 
0.68 
(0.48) 
-1.52 
(0.46) 
Indonesia -2.20 (0.81) 
6.08 
(0.93) 
4.85 
(1.83) 
-28.01 
(1.19) 
Ireland 1.92* (2.26) 
-1.16 
(1.63) 
0.41 
(0.79) 
-0.30 
(0.10) 
Italy -0.01 (0.01) 
-2.42 
(0.66) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
11.10 
(0.75) 
Japan -2.09 (0.47) 
10.16 
(0.38) 
-1.40 
(0.32) 
-39.99 
(0.35) 
Malaysia 8.94* (8.55) 
-8.50* 
(8.79) 
0.46 
(1.63) 
0.71 
(0.37) 
Mexico -2.41 (0.70) 
5.68 
(0.94) 
0.77 
(0.55) 
13.12 
(1.00) 
Netherlands 2.01 (1.52) 
-4.68 
(1.42) 
0.12 
(0.18) 
12.61 
(1.18) 
New Zealand -1.35* (2.05) 
0.71 
(0.64) 
1.12* 
(3.89) 
10.90* 
(5.37) 
Norway 10.13* (5.38) 
-17.33* 
(4.28) 
1.38* 
(2.13) 
42.66* 
(4.35) 
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Philippines 2.36 (1.89) 
-0.66 
(0.57) 
0.67 
(2.12) 
-6.11* 
(3.57) 
Portugal 6.90* (7.13) 
-2.39 
(1.00) 
1.29 
(1.65) 
-13.25 
(1.23) 
Singapore 3.32* (8.78) 
-1.68* 
(5.69) 
0.06 
(0.37) 
-7.33* 
(5.25) 
Spain 5.41* (7.22) 
-6.77* 
(6.04) 
0.47 
(1.12) 
8.40* 
(2.73) 
Sweden 50.18 (0.61) 
-86.13 
(0.60) 
-3.24 
(0.63) 
146.66 
(0.57) 
Switzerland 6.57* (8.77) 
-9.95* 
(5.23) 
-0.47 
(0.86) 
13.32* 
(2.79) 
Thailand 2.97 (1.39) 
-4.15 
(1.93) 
0.63 
(0.98) 
7.20* 
(2.91) 
United 
Kingdom 
4.38* 
(6.36) 
-6.57* 
(5.28) 
-0.62 
(0.99) 
4.74 
(0.87) 
United States 4.51* (3.56) 
-11.60* 
(3.45) 
0.47 
(0.47) 
35.25* 
(2.14) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent absolute values of t-statistic; * denotes 
significance at 5% level. 
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Table 5: Patterns Based on the Signs of REX 
 
Trading 
Partner 
 
Short-Run  Long-Run 
Whole 
Sample 
Pre-Crisis Post-
Crisis 
Whole 
Sample 
Pre-Crisis Post-
Crisis 
Australia − + − + − + + 
Austria + J N + + − 
Belgium − J − +* +* + 
Brazil W + W + − + 
China M + N + − + 
Denmark + W M + − + 
France − J − − − − 
Germany − − J + +* − 
Greece − − − +  −* 
Hong Kong + J J + + − 
India W + − + − + + + 
Indonesia + N + − +* +* + 
Ireland + M + + − + 
Italy − + − − +* +* + 
Japan J J N −* −* − 
Malaysia W + − + −* + + 
Mexico + J + +* + + 
Netherland + J + + − + 
New Zealand + M − +* + +* 
Norway M W + − − + +* 
Philippines + J + + −* +* 
Portugal N J − + −* + 
Singapore N J + − +* − + 
Spain N + − + −* + 
Sweden N M + − − − 
Switzerland N − W + + − 
Thailand W  + − + + 
U. Kingdom + M − +* + − 
U.S.A − + M − + + 
Note: * in the long−run results denotes significance at 5% level. 
 
